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T is a month before trial. You are preparing witnesses and filing the
necessary pre-trial documents. You look at your petition and recall-
vaguely-the request for attorneys' fees that you eagerly injected
into the case months or years ago. Or, perhaps you have just won a mo-
tion for summary judgment and there is nothing left to seek from the
court, except perhaps ... attorneys' fees. Appropriately, seeking attor-
neys' fees is not often the focus of a business litigator's practice., How-
ever, skillfully requesting and obtaining attorneys' fees can create
enormous client satisfaction. Clients-regardless of what they might tell
us-are never eager to pay legal fees. Moreover, in the case of a contin-
gent fee arrangement, obtaining your fee from the opposing litigant can
greatly increase the monetary award to the plaintiff. Thus, after success-
fully pursuing a claim for your client, obtaining an award requiring the
opposing side to pay your legal fees can be the icing on the proverbial
legal cake.
This article is intended to provide a summary of the relevant Texas law
regarding the recovery of legal fees and expenses in business litigation
cases.2 In Section one, we discuss the most common ways to recover legal
fees in Texas business litigation cases. In Section two, the basic fee recov-
ery statute-Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.04-is an-
alyzed. In Section three, we discuss the mechanics of calculating the
appropriate amount of a request for attorneys' fees. In Section four, we
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1. In fact, the Supreme Court once stated that "the time, expense, and difficulties of
proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable attorneys' fees
would pose substantial burdens for judicial administration." Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
2. This article is not intended to analyze all Texas statutes that provide for the recov-
ery of attorneys' fees. However, this article is intended to be published annually, and later
publications may focus on the recovery of attorneys' fees in other types of matters.
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discuss the recovery of litigation costs and expenses. Finally, in Section
five, we provide practical suggestions for the recovery of your attorneys'
fees.
I. BUSINESS TORTS PROVIDING FOR THE RECOVERY OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES
The general rule is that a litigant cannot recover its attorneys' fees and
expenses from its opponent unless a contractual 3 or statutory provision
provides otherwise. 4 Accordingly, there are four main statutes that a
Texas business litigator should be familiar with regarding the recovery of
attorneys' fees. 5 Specifically, a Texas litigator should consider seeking at-
torneys' fees in breach of contract actions, deceptive trade practices act
matters, declaratory judgment proceedings, and/or shareholder derivative
actions. However, an attorney should also consider seeking attorneys'
fees on equitable grounds.
A. RECOVERING ATrORNEYS' FEES IN BREACH OF
CONTRACT ACTIONS
Chapter 38 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits a prevail-
ing party6 to recover attorneys' fees and costs in a breach of contract
case.7 To obtain attorneys' fees under Chapter 38, a party must satisfy
3. "A contractual provision providing for attorneys' fees will establish a prima facie
case that the stipulated amount is reasonable and recoverable .... The burden then shifts
to the opposing party to plead, prove, and request an issue on an affirmative defense that:
(1) the contractual amount is unreasonable, and (2) a particular known amount would be
reasonable." O'Kehie v. Harris Leasing Co., 80 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2002, no pet.) (citing F.R. Hernandez Constr. & Supply Co. v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce,
578 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1979).)
4. See Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Seven Inv. Co., 835 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. 1992);
Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1996); Holland v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. 1999); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Tex. In-
dus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967); Turner v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex.
1964); Mundy v. Knutson Constr. Co., 294 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Tex. 1956); Massey v. Colum-
bus State Bank, 35 S.W.3d 697, 701 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied);
Grimes v. Grimes, 612 S.W.2d 714, 715 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ);
Simmons v. Harris County, 917 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996,
writ denied); State v. Estate of Brown, 802 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991,
no writ).
5. Other claims that a business litigator should consider seeking legal fees in connec-
tion with include federal and certain state antitrust, trade regulation, racketeering, and
intellectual property claims.
6. A prevailing party is "'one of the parties to a suit who successfully prosecutes the
action or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even though not to
the extent of its original contention."' Johns v. Ram-Forwarding, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 635, 638
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (quoting City of Amarillo v. Glick, 991
S.W.2d 14, 17 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no pet.); citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Gra-
ham, 882 S.W.2d 890, 900 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ)). Furthermore,
a party can "prevail" without receiving damages. Ram-Forwarding, 29 S.W.3d at 638; but
see Green Int'l, Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Tex. 1997).
7. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 2001). Chapter 38 pro-
vides: "a person may recover reasonable attorneys' fees from an individual or corporation,
in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for: (1) rendered ser-
vices; (2) performed labor; (3) furnished material; (4) freight or express overcharges;
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three requirements: (1) prevail8 and recover damages9 in its breach of
contract action; 10 (2) present evidence of a reasonable fee for the services
rendered in connection with the prevailing claim; and (3) satisfy the pro-
cedural requirements of Section 38.002 regarding presentment." Pro-
vided that a litigant satisfies these requirements, recovery of attorneys'
fees under this provision is mandatory.'2 "A trial court has discretion to
fix the amount of attorneys' fees, but it does not have the discretion to
completely deny attorneys' fees if they are proper under Section
38.001."13
Importantly, the Texas Supreme Court has extended 38.001 to provide
for the recovery of attorneys' fees for fraud claims when the fraud arises
out of a breach of contract action.14 Other appellate courts have ex-
tended this exception to any "tort" that arises out of a breach of con-
tract. 15 This was true-at least in one case-when the party seeking fees
did not actually prevail on the breach of contract claim. 16 This is a great
(5) lost or damaged freight or express; (6) killed or injured stock; (7) a sworn account; or
(8) an oral or written contract." Id. at § 38.001. Chapter 38 does not apply to some con-
tracts issued by insurers. See Id. § 38.006.
8. A prevailing party is one who is "vindicated by the trial court's judgment." Polk v.
St. Angelo, No. 03-01-00356-C (Tex. App.-Austin May 31, 2002, no pet.) (not designated
for publication) (2002 WL 1070050).
9. See Mobile Producing Tex. & N.M., Inc. v. Cantor, 93 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2002, no pet. h.), Brosseau v. Ranzau, 81 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 2002, pet. denied). Even if a party "prevails," the statue requires that the party also
recover damages to obtain legal fees pursuant to Section 38.001. See Green Int'l, 951
S.W.2d at 390; see also Law Offices of Windle Turley v. French, No. 2-01-080-CV (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2003 WL 253643, at *7
(denying attorneys' fees when no damages or anything of value awarded); N.T. Dev., Inc.
v. J.A.B.E, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
10. A defendant cannot recover fees under section 38.001 for defeating a breach of
contract claim. See Rainbow Group, Ltd. v. Johnson, No. 03-00-00559-CV, 2001 WL
1991141, at *12 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 30, 2002, pet. denied). However, the "party seek-
ing attorneys' fees need not obtain net recovery." Gereb v. Smith Jaye, 7 S.W.3d 272 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
11. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 38.001, 38.002 (Vernon 2001); Flint &
Assoc. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987,
writ denied). Section 38.002 provides "(1) the claimant must be represented by an attor-
ney; (2) the claimant must present the claim to the opposing party or to a duly authorized
agent of the opposing party; and (3) payment for the just amount owed must not have been
tendered before the expiration of the 30th day after the claim is presented." TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002 (Vernon 2001).
12. See Cale's Clean Scene CarWash, Inc. v. Hubbard, 76 S.W.3d 784, 787 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th District] 2002, no pet.); Cotter v. Todd, No. 04-01-00084-CV (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Oct. 9, 2002, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL
31253397, at *6; Jackson Law Office, P.C. v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15, 23 (Tex. App.-Tyler
2000, pet. denied); World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 662, 683 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied); Budd v. Gay, 846 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
13. World Help, 977 S.W.2d at 683.
14. See Gill Sav. Ass'n v. Chair King, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 31, 31 (Tex. 1990).
15. Schindler v. Austwell Farmers Coop., 829 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992, affd as modified by Schindler v. Austwell Farmers Coop., 841 S.W.2d 853
(Tex. 1992)) (citing Gill Say. Ass'n, 797 S.W.2d at 31; Wilson v. Ferguson, 747 S.W.2d 499,
504 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied)).




opportunity to obtain attorneys' fees and should not be overlooked.
1. Presenting Evidence of a Reasonable Fee
Chapter 38 requires the litigant to present evidence regarding the rea-
sonable nature of the fee award sought. However, the statute provides
some assistance in establishing the reasonable amount of a fee. Under
Section 38.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, "[i]t is presumed
that the usual and customary attorneys' fees for a claim of the type de-
scribed in Section 38.001 are reasonable. ' 17 However, the fact that
"usual and customary" fees are deemed per se reasonable does not mean
that the court must award the full amount of "usual and customary
fees."' 18 At least one court has held that the "usual and customary" fees
determined by the court create a ceiling above which the court cannot
award.19 Notwithstanding that ceiling, the same court believed that the
court has discretion to award an amount below that ceiling.20 Moreover,
the presumption in favor of the reasonableness of "usual and customary"
fees can be rebutted by competent evidence. 21
The court can also "take judicial notice of the usual and customary
attorneys' fees and of the contents of the case file" without receiving any
other evidence in a bench trial or in a jury case in which the amount of
attorneys' fees is submitted to the court with the consent of the parties.22
This means that in such circumstances, the court can determine the rea-
sonable amount of attorneys' fees completely on its own by applying the
1.04 factors 23 to the work described in the case file and the "usual and
customary" fees for a similar claim.24
2. Presentment
Because it is so easily overlooked, the most difficult element to satisfy
to obtain attorneys' fees in a breach of contract action is often present-
ment. Section 38.002 requires a litigant seeking attorneys' fees to "pre-
sent the claim to the opposing party or to a duly authorized agent of the
opposing party. '25 This means that a plaintiff seeking fees under this
chapter must both plead2 6 and "prove presentment to recover attorneys'
fees claimed."'27 Presentment can be made either before or after suit is
17. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.003 (Vernon 2001).
18. Bethel v. Butler Drilling Co., 635 S.W.2d 834, 841 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th




22. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 (Vernon 2001).
23. Infra sec. II.
24. Bethel, 635 S.W.2d at 841.
25. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002 (Vernon 2001).
26. See Llanes v. Davila, No. 13-02-129-CV, 2003 WL 124833, at *5 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi Jan. 16, 2003, no pet. h.) (noting request for attorneys' fee in first amended
answer, original counterclaim and referenced in responses to requests for disclosure).
27. Vingcard A.S. v. Merrimac Hospitality Sys. Inc., 59 S.W.3d 847, 867 (Tex. App.-
Ft. Worth 2001, pet. denied).
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filed, but presentment must be made at least thirty days before judg-
ment.28 The rationale behind the presentment requirement is to enable a
defendant to pay a claim before accruing attorneys' fees.29 Various forms
of presentment have been held to be sufficient.30 The essential element is
that there is notice given before judgment.31 However, an unreasonably
excessive demand is improper and will result in the disallowal of fees. 32
Further, presentment can be contractually waived.33
B. RECOVERING ATTORNEYS' FEES IN DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTIONS
Section 37.009 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits the
recovery of costs and attorneys' fees in a declaratory judgment action.34
Under section 37.009, the decision to award attorneys' fees is completely
at the discretion of the trial court.35 Furthermore, even a non-prevailing
28. Id. The pleadings themselves do not constitute demand. Id.; see also Grace v.
Duke, 54 S.W.3d 338, 338-44 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.) ("[T]he mere filing of a
breach of contract suit does not constitute presentment.").
29. Vingcard, 59 S.W.3d at 867.
30. Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981) (holding letter and telephone con-
versation informing sellers of buyers' intentions to go through with sale of property met
requirements of presentment); Criton Corp. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 355, 358
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (holding that oral request to tender
full performance under contract, which was refused, sufficient to establish presentment);
Marifarms Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Westhoff, 802 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991,
no writ) (oral demand during deposition); De Los Santos v. S.W. Tex. Methodist Hosp.,
802 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ) (original bill or invoice sent
to buyer was sufficient); Adams v. Petrade Int'l, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696, 719 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (holding notice of payment due date was sufficient);
Richard Gill Co. v. Jackson's Landing Owners' Ass'n, 758 S.W.2d 921, 926-27 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (holding demand letter and testimony that demand was
made and turned down was sufficient to establish presentment); Bethel v. Norman Furni-
ture Co. Inc., 756 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (demand
letter attached to motion and produced during discovery but never previously sent was
sufficient); Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental Corp., 739 S.W.2d 460, 470 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1987, writ denied) (holding discussion between attorneys regarding claim was pre-
sentment); Plains Ins. Co. v. Evans, 692 S.W.2d 952, 956-57 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985,
no writ) (same); Tierney v. Lane, Gorman, Trubitt & Co., 664 S.W.2d 840, 843-44 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (notation on check paid under protest is present-
ment); Humble Exploration Co. v. Amcap Petroleum Ass'n, 658 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding discovery request sufficient); Welch v. Gain-
mage, 545 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that
request for admission and its response in which party admitted refusal to pay a claim suffi-
cient to establish presentment); Hudson v. Smith, 391 S.W.2d 441, 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (prior lawsuit).
31. Vingcard, 59 S.W.3d at 867; see also Norman Furniture, 756 S.W.2d at 8 ("When
the question of attorneys' fees is submitted to the court, the court may consider the entire
case file to determine whether presentment was made."); Llanes, 2003 WL 124833, at *6(pleading presentment and allegations that are not challenged establishes presentment);
Sanchez v. Jary, 768 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ); Wallace v.
Ramon, 82 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
32. Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. BBE L.L.C., No. 11-01-00052-CV, 2002 WL 31520345 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2002, no pet. h.).
33. See Escalante v. Luckie, 77 S.W.3d 410 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. denied).
34. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 2001).
35. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998) ("The statute thus affords
the trial court a measure of discretion in deciding whether to award attorney fees or not.");
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party can recover fees.36
While the award of attorneys' fees is at the court's discretion,37 the
Code imposes certain limitations on that discretion. 38 First, the fees must
be "reasonable and necessary. '39 Whether the fees are "reasonable and
necessary" is a question reserved for the fact finder.40 However, there
must be factually sufficient evidence to support the award of fees. 41 The
recovery of fees must also be "equitable and just."'4 2 The question of
whether the award of fees is "equitable and just" is an issue to be re-
solved by the court. 43
While either party can recover attorneys' fees in a declaratory judg-
ment action,44 fees will not be awarded when a defendant asserts a coun-
terclaim for a declaratory judgment that is the "mirror image" of one of
the plaintiff's asserted claims.45 However, the question often becomes
whether the issue is already pending before the court when the request
for a declaration is sought. If it is not, fees can be awarded as long as the
Oake v. Collin County, 692 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. 1985) ("[T]he grant or denial of attor-
neys' fees in a declaratory judgment action lies within the discretion of the trial court, and
its judgment will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing that it abused that
discretion."); Justice Bail Bonds v. Samaniego, 68 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2001, pet. denied); Hansen v. Academy Corp., 961 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied); Trien v. Equity Real Estate, Inc., No. 08-99-00464-CV (Tex.
App.-El Paso Nov. 8, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2001 WL 1383115,
at *4. However, it is an abuse of discretion for a court to award attorneys' fees pursuant to
section 37.009 "when the statute is relied upon solely as a vehicle to recover attorneys'
fees." Strayhorn v. Raytheon E-Sys., Inc., No. 03-02-00346-CV, 2003 WL 192105, at *12
(Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 30, 2003, no pet. h. ).
36. Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied)
("Whether a party prevails ... is not a determining factor in avoiding attorneys' fees."); See
Hatton v. Grigar, 66 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Barshop
v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 637 (Tex. 1996)
("[T]he award of attorneys' fees in declaratory judgment actions is clearly within the trial
court's discretion and is not dependent on a finding that a party 'substantially prevailed."').
37. Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20.
38. Id. at 20-21.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 21; Brush v. Reata Oil & Gas Corp., 984 S.W.2d 720, 729 (Tex. App.-Waco
1998, pet. denied). The fact finder can seek guidance on whether fees are "reasonable and
necessary" by examining the factors provided by Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.04, discussed in
detail below. See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21; infra Section II; but see Schwedler v. Wright,
No. 07-98-0281-CV (Tex. App.-Amarillo Apr. 8, 1999, pet. denied) (not designated for
publication) (1999 WL 236511, *7) (opining that Andersen court's use of "should" rather
than "must" makes the 1.04 analysis discretionary).
41. Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21.
42. Id.
43. City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 367 (Tex. 2000); Bocquet,
972 S.W.2d at 21 ("Matters of equity are addressed to the trial court's discretion ... so is
the responsibility for just decisions."); Trien, 2001 WL 1383115, at *4.
44. Note: only a party asserting a breach of contract can receive fees pursuant to sec-
tion 38.001. See Smith v. Tex. Farmers Ins. Co., 82 S.W.3d 580, 588 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2002, pet. denied).
45. See Whiteside v. Griffis & Griffis, P.C., 902 S.W.2d 739, 746-77 (Tex. App.-Austin
1995, writ denied); HECI Exploration Co. v. Clajon Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 622, 638-39 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); John Chezik Buick Co. v. Friendly Chevrolet Co., 749
S.W.2d 591, 594-95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
1120 [Vol. 56
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declaration sought does not closely resemble the plaintiff's claims. 46
Thus, a litigant should promptly assert a request for a declaratory judg-
ment to preserve the right to recover attorneys' fees.47
C. RECOVERING ATTORNEYS' FEES IN A DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES ACTION
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (the "DTPA") also permits
the recovery of attorneys' fees. In fact, any consumer who prevails on a
DTPA claim "shall" be awarded court costs and attorneys' fees. 48 Con-
versely, a defendant may recover attorneys' fees under the DTPA if the
court finds that an action was "groundless in fact or law, brought in bad
faith, or brought for the purpose of harassment. '49 Whether the plaintiff
or defendant recovers attorneys' fees, the fees must be "reasonable and
necessary." 50
The interpretation of "reasonable" by the Texas courts in context of
attorneys' fees awarded under the DTPA has produced strange results.
In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., the Texas Supreme
Court held that attorneys' fees may be reasonable as between the client
and attorney for purposes of the standard set forth in Rule 104 of the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, but unreasonable in
the context of an award for attorneys' fees under the DTPA.5 1 Thus, in
the case of a contingent fee contract, a consumer may need to use part of
his or her DTPA recovery to compensate his or her attorney, leaving the
consumer without full recovery.
1. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Consumer
As mentioned above, Section 17.50(d) of the DTPA provides that a
prevailing consumer "shall be awarded court costs and reasonable and
necessary attorneys' fees."' -2 Since the award is mandatory, the critical
determination is whether the consumer has "prevailed. '53 The Texas Su-
preme Court has interpreted the word "prevailed" liberally. The Court
46. See BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. 1990); John G. &
Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Found. v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268, 289 (Tex. 2002) (deny-
ing fees where declaration relief was "merely incidental" to title issues); Brousseau, 81
S.W.3d at 397-98; Thomas v. Thomas, 902 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ
denied); Brush, 984 S.W.2d at 730-31. But see Hanzel v. Herring, 80 S.W.3d 167 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
47. Of course, "a declaratory judgment action may not be used solely to obtain attor-
neys' fees that are not otherwise authorized by statute or to settle disputes already pending
before a court." Hopkins v. Netterville, No. 12-20-00339-CV (Tex. App.-Tyler Jan. 16,
2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 59278, *8 (reversing attorneys'
fees award).
48. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 2002).
49. Id. § 17.50(c).
50. Supra notes 41, 42.
51. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997).
52. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 2002).
53. See, e.g., Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Low, 79 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Tex. 2002) (denying
attorneys' fees for failure to prevail on DTPA claim).
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has held, for example, that a consumer "prevails" if the consumer has
been awarded any of the remedies authorized under section 17.50(b),
even if a net recovery was awarded against the consumer. 54
Given that many suits involve successful and unsuccessful DTPA
claims, courts require an allocation of fees between the claims unless
there is a substantial overlap among the claims.55 Additionally, an award
should include appropriate amounts for appeals or be reduced if an ap-
peal is not taken.56
2. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Defendant
Since the DTPA provides consumers with substantial powers against
defendants, the statute could potentially be used to harass or intimidate.
To prevent such abuses, the DTPA provides for an award of attorneys'
fees to a defendant when the consumer's suit was "groundless in fact or
law or brought in bad faith, or brought for the purpose of harassment. '57
As with a consumer's recovery of attorneys' fees, if the defendant has met
this requirement and satisfied the "prevail" requirement, the award of
attorneys' fees is mandatory.
The existence of bad faith, groundlessness, or harassment is determined
by the court, not the jury.58 These terms are not defined in the DTPA,
but the Texas Supreme Court has applied the definition of Rule 13 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to define "groundless" for purposes of the
DTPA as a suit with "no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law."'59 "Bad faith," although not defined in DTPA case law, has been
defined in many other contexts as any indicia of improper motive, such as
ill will, spite, malice, reckless disregard, or dishonesty. 60 Finally, "harass-
ment," although not defined in the DTPA, generally means annoyance,
irritation, or disturbance. 61
Another protection afforded to defendants under the DTPA is the no-
tice requirement of section 17.505, which requires that at a consumer give
a defendant at least sixty (60) days notice prior to filing suit.62 The notice
must give "reasonable detail of the consumer's specific complaint" and
the amount of all forms of damages, expenses, and any attorneys' fees
54. McKinley v. Drozd, 685 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. 1985).
55. See Williamson v. Tucker, 615 S.W.2d 881, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
56. See Int'l Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1971).
57. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 2002).
58. Id.; Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex. 1989).
59. Donwerth, 775 S.W.2d at 637; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
60. See McDuffie v. Blassingame, 883 S.W.2d 329, 335 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994,
writ denied); Holeman v. Landmark Chevrolet Corp., 989 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); Zak v. Parks, 729 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Transp. Indem. Co. v. Orgain, Bell & Tucker, 846
S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993), writ denied per curiam, 856 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.
1993).
61. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (7th ed. 1990).
62. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505 (Vernon 2002).
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reasonably incurred by the consumer. 63 Failure to include attorneys' fees
should not affect the sufficiency of the notice letter but, for purposes of
attorneys' fees, allows for the presumption that none exist and settlement
may be made without payment of such fees.64
For a defendant, a well-drafted settlement offer letter provides the best
opportunity to either recover attorneys' fees or limit its liability for the
consumer's attorneys' fees in the event the consumer is ultimately suc-
cessful. Under section 17.5052, if the defendant's settlement offer was the
same, substantially the same, or more than the amount of damages found
by the trier of fact, then the consumer's attorneys fees are limited to the
amount of reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees incurred before the
date and time of the rejected settlement offer.65 If the defendant's settle-
ment offer was for the full amount requested by the consumer in the no-
tice, but the consumer rejects the offer, the rejection is evidence that the
suit was brought for the purpose of harassment and the defendant may be
able to recover its attorneys' fees from the consumer under Section
17.50(c), even if the case action was not groundless. 66
D. RECOVERING ATTORNEYS' FEES IN SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
Although less common, attorneys' fees can also be awarded in share-
holder derivative litigation. Upon the termination of a shareholder deriv-
ative lawsuit, the court is empowered to award attorneys' fees incurred by
one or both of the parties.67 Specifically, Article 5.14J of the Texas Busi-
ness Corporation Act provides that the court may order:
(a) the domestic or foreign corporation to pay the expenses of the
plaintiff incurred in the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding has
resulted in a substantial benefit to the domestic or foreign corpora-
tion; (b) the plaintiff to pay the expenses of the domestic or foreign
corporation or any defendant incurred in investigating and defending
the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding was commenced or
maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose; or
(c) a party to pay the expenses incurred by another party (including
the domestic or foreign corporation) because of the filing of a plead-
ing, motion, or other paper, if it finds that the pleading, motion, or
other paper (i) was not well grounded in fact after reasonable in-
quiry, (ii) was not warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or
(iii) was interposed for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. 68
63. Id.
64. See Silva v. Porowski, 695 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Minor v. Aland, 775 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
65. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.505(h), 17.5052 (Vernon 2002).
66. See Donwerth, 775 S.W.2d at 638.




Expenses are defined in the statute as the "reasonable expenses incurred
in the defense of a derivative proceeding, including without limitation: (a)
attorneys' fees; (b) costs in pursuing an investigation of the matter that
was the subject of the derivative proceeding; and (c) expenses for which
the domestic or foreign corporation or a corporate defendant may be re-
quired to indemnify another person. 69
There is little case law interpreting Article 5.14J. However, the lan-
guage of the statute and the limited case law that exists makes it clear that
depending on the evidence, either-or both-of the parties can collect
attorneys' fees in a derivative matter if the statutory requirements are
met.
1. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Derivative Plaintiff
As provided above, Article 5.14J(1)(a) allows a court to award a pre-
vailing plaintiff legal fees if the proceeding has resulted in a "substantial
benefit" to the corporation. 70 Further, a plaintiff can also recover fees
from corporation under Article 5.14J(1)(c) for specific improper filings
by the corporation. 71 Although the authors cannot locate a case directly
addressing the bounds of this statute, presumably, the plaintiff could re-
cover its fees for responding to any such pleading, motion, or other paper
in the entire case-regardless of whether the proceeding ultimately re-
sulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation.72
2. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Corporation
As explained above, Article 5.14 also allows a court to order the plain-
tiff to pay the corporation's expenses incurred in investigating and de-
fending the shareholder derivative proceeding if the court "finds that the
proceeding was commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or
for an improper purpose. ' 73 An award under this statute is discretionary,
not mandatory. 74 Further, the phrase "without reasonable cause" is not
defined in the statute and is obviously subject to numerous interpreta-
69. Id.
70. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.14 § J(1)(a); Rowe v. Rowe, 887 S.W.2d 191,
198 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied) ("Attorneys' fees are only recoverable by a
successful plaintiff in a shareholder's derivative suit."); see also Bayoud v. Bayoud, 797
S.W.2d 304, 315 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
71. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.14 § J(1)(c) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
72. See id.
73. See id. The previous version of Article 5.14 was somewhat ambiguous with respect
to whether the court or the jury was supposed to make the determination of whether the
proceeding was brought without reasonable cause. See Campbell v. Walker, No. 14-96-
01425-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 13, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for
publication), 2000 WL 19143, at *3-6 (holding determination to be made by court); Econ.
Gas, Inc. v. Burke, No. 14-93-01016-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 2, 1996,
writ denied) (not designated for publication), 1996 WL 220903, at *11 (concurring and
dissenting opinion) ("[T]he statute, by its plain and unambiguous terms, allows 'a finding'
of reasonable cause to be made by the court or jury.") However, the 1997 amendments to
the statute make it clear that the court is to make such determination.




tions. Recently, the Fourteenth District Court in Bass v. Walker, ana-
lyzed the meaning of this phrase. 75
In Bass, the plaintiffs argued that "'without reasonable cause' should
be interpreted as a subjective standard, requiring a finding that the plain-
tiff knew the suit was groundless at the time he filed it."' 76 The court
disagreed and held that "a plaintiff acts without reasonable cause under
article 5.14F if, at the time he brings suit: (1) the claims asserted by the
plaintiff in the lawsuit are not warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; or
(2) the allegations in the plaintiff's suit are not well grounded in fact after
reasonable inquiry. ' 77 Although the Bass court did not elaborate on its
rationale for developing this standard, it appears that it was guided in its
interpretation of the meaning of Article 5.14J(1)(b) by the language con-
tained in Article 5.14J(1)(c). 78
In addition to Article 5.14J(1)(b), the corporation-like the derivative
plaintiff in the case of the corporation's filings-can also recover fees
from the derivative plaintiff under Article 5.14J(1)(c) for specific im-
proper filings by the corporation. Again, the authors cannot locate con-
trolling case law, but the language of the statute seems to provide the
corporation with a second bite at the fee apple. In other words, even if
the corporation cannot establish that the entire proceeding was com-
menced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper pur-
pose, the statute seems to grant the corporation the right to test all of the
pleadings, motions, and other papers filed by the plaintiff to determine if
any of one or more of such filings (i) was not well grounded in fact after
reasonable inquiry, (ii) was not warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or
(iii) was interposed for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.79 Al-
though this is an undoubtedly tedious task, the attorneys' fees associated
with a particular pleading or motion may be worth the effort of reviewing
the entire case file prior to submitting the fee application.
E. RECOVERING FEES ON EQUITABLE GROUNDS
Notwithstanding the general rule that attorneys' fees are not recover-
able unless a contractual or statutory provision permits otherwise, "equi-
table principles may allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees" if a party is
required to prosecute or defend a suit because of the "wrongful act" of its
opponent.80 In Massey v. Columbus State Bank, the Houston Court of
75. Bass v. Walker, No. 14-01-00532 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th District] Mar. 6, 2003,




79. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14 § J(1)(c) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
80. See Massey, 35 S.W.3d at 701; Baja Energy, Inc. v. Ball, 669 S.W.2d 836, 838-39
(Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, no writ); see also Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Manney, 238
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Appeals for the First District broadly interpreted this exception by
awarding fees to the plaintiffs when the defendant simply failed to answer
the plaintiffs' petition and the petition included claims of "wrongful con-
duct" by the defendants. 8' A party also may be able to recover reasona-
ble and necessary attorneys' fees and expenses as damages when the
defendant's wrongful conduct forced the plaintiff to prosecute or defend
litigation in another proceeding.8 2
The common fund doctrine is the most recognized exception to "the
general rule that, absent a statutory or contractual basis for an award of
attorneys' fees, each litigant must bear his own [attorneys' fees]."'83
"Under the common fund doctrine, the court may allow reasonable attor-
neys' fees to a litigant who, at his own expense, has maintained a suit
which creates a fund benefiting other parties as well as himself."'84
"The common fund doctrine is based on the principle that those receiv-
ing the benefits of the suit should bear their fair share of the expenses. ''85
The attorneys' fees are allowed as a charge against the fund. 86 An attor-
neys' compensation from non-contracting plaintiffs under the common
fund doctrine is limited to the reasonable value of the attorneys' services
benefiting them.87 The common fund doctrine is commonly used in class
actions.88
Because of the name of this doctrine, it might seem that the fund cre-
ated by the action must be for the benefit of a number of beneficiaries.
However, as long as the litigant has created a fund for others, it need only
establish that others have benefited in order to seek attorneys' fees from
the fund based on the common fund doctrine.89
S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Pacesetter
Pools, Inc. v. Pierce Homes, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet. h.).
81. See Massey, 35 S.W.3d at 701.
82. See Lesikar v. Rappeport, 33 S.W.3d 282, 317 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet.
denied).
83. Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Seals, 948 S.W.2d 532, 534 n.1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1997, no writ); City of Dallas v. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d 942, 954 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ
denied).
84. Lancer Corp. v. Murillo, 909 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no
writ) (citing Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-537 (1881); Knebel v. Capital Nat'l
Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 799-801 (Tex. 1974)).
85. Lancer, 909 S.W.2d at 126. (citing Greenough, 105 U.S. at 533-534; Knebel, 518
S.W.2d at 799).
86. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 954; cf. Valle v. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co., 5 S.W.3d 745,
746-47 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (holding common fund doctrine not
applicable).
87. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 955.
88. See, e.g., Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 954 (shareholder derivative suits); Bayliss v.
Cernock, 773 S.W.2d 384, 386-87 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied)
(same); Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Tex., 175 S.W. 816, 821
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1915, no writ) (insurance subrogation); Crouch v. Tenneco, Inc.,
853 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied) (upholding award of attorneys'
fees to'class counsel on equitable principle of "common fund").
89. See Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 175 S.W. at 817; Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783,
803-04 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
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II. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE RECOVERY OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Assuming that an attorney has the right-whether by contract, statute,
or in equity-to recover attorneys' fees, the next question addresses the
amount of fees that can be collected. While the amount of the fee will
obviously vary from case to case, one basic principle will exist-the
amount of the fee must be "reasonable." "A fee is unconscionable if a
competent lawyer could not form a reasonable belief that the fee is rea-
sonable ... [and] the reasonableness of any fee depends on the circum-
stances of the services." 90 Indeed, an attorneys' fees award can be larger
than a litigants' recovery on its substantive claim and still be "reasonable"
in certain circumstances. 91
Texas courts determine whether a fee is "reasonable" based upon the
factors specified in Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct
1.04.92 Those factors are:
1. the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service
properly;
2. the likelihood... that the acceptance of the particular employment
will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
3. the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
4. the amount involved and the results obtained;
5. the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
6. the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
7. the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per-
forming the services; and
8. whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncer-
tainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered. 93
Evidence of each of the factors is not required to support an attorneys'
90. Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, 22 S.W.3d 857, 867 (Tex. 2000) (J. Gonzales,
joined by C.J. Phillips, concurring and dissenting).
91. See Flint & Assoc., 739 S.W.2d at 626 (attorneys' fees awarded nearly seven times
actual damages); Hawkins v. Owens, No. 01-99-00918-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
Aug. 24, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication), 2000 WL 1199254, at *9
(awarding attorneys' fees that were two and one-half times larger than the amount paid
and judgment awarded, and over five and one-half times the amount of the $5,000 judg-
ment for contract damages when "case was transformed from what should have been a
simple suit on a loan agreement to a lengthy, drawn-out battle extending from 1995 to
1999").
92. The reasonableness of an attorneys' fee award is generally a jury question. See
City of Garland, 22 S.W.2d at 367.
93. Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.04; see also Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 818.
The opposing party's attorneys' fees are not necessarily relevant to the analysis. See MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. Crowley, 899 S.W.2d 399, 403 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)
("MCI's attorneys' fees in its defense of this case are 'patently irrelevant and are not rea-
sonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."'); see also M.D. Mark,
Inc. v. PIHI P'ship, No. 01-98-00724-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 7, 2001, no
pet.) (not designated for publication) (2001 WL 619604, at *12-13).
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fees award. 94 However, evidence of some of these factors must be pre-
sent to support an award. 95
A. THE ANDERSEN STANDARD
The most often cited Texas case regarding the reasonableness of con-
tingent fee awards is Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp.96
According to Andersen, a trial court cannot award attorneys' fees purely
on evidence of a percentage fee agreement.97 Instead, the Court held
that a trial court must take into consideration all of the Rule 1.04 factors
when making an award of attorneys' fees. 98
The Andersen court focused on two major problems presented by bas-
ing an attorneys' fee award solely on a contingent fee contract. First, a
contingent award based solely on a percentage would ignore many of the
factors that courts should consider in determining reasonableness.99 Sec-
ond, since juries are often not informed of what the total amount of the
judgment will be, a percentage award, without reference to the Rule 1.04
factors, can be based on pure speculation.' 00 Accordingly, the Court held
that, while a fact finder can consider the existence of a contingent fee
agreement when making its findings on reasonable fees, it is prohibited
from issuing an award based purely on a percentage calculation. 101
In Vingcard A.S. v. Merrimac Hospitality Systems, Inc., the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals, interpreting Andersen, held that an attorney can still
request that the jury calculate attorneys' fees as a percentage of damages
awarded. 102 Because the jury in that case "was free to reject his re-
94. Columbia Rio Grande Reg'l Hosp. v. Stover, 17 S.W.3d 387, 397 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); Herring v. Bocquet, 21 S.W.3d 367, 368 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2000, no pet.).
95. See Sieber & Calicutt, Inc. v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 66 S.W.3d 340, 351 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied) (upholding trial court's denial of a fee award where there
was no evidence to support any of the 1.04 factors); City of Weatherford v. Catron, 83
S.W.3d 261, 272-73 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (affirming award of fees where
evidence was presented of five of factors); Checker Bag Co. v. Washington, 27 S.W.3d 625,
640 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied); Hagedorn v. Tisdale, 73 S.W.3d 341 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.). Stover, 17 S.W.3d at 397; M.D. Mark, Inc, 2001 WL
619604, at *12-13.
96. Arthur Andeson & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d at 818. Andersen dealt
specifically with the award of attorneys' fees in a DTPA action. However, courts have
applied Andersen's holding to all proceedings where attorneys' fees are "shifted from one
party to the other." Jackson Law Office, P.C., 37 S.W.3d at 24.
97. Anderson, 945 S.W.2d at 818; see also Seacoast, Inc. v. LaCouture, No. 03-96-
00506-CV (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 29, 1998, pet. denied) (not designated for publication),
1998 WL 29966 at *8 (reversing fee award where evidence supporting attorneys' fee award
consisted of attorney and client testifying to terms of contingent fee agreement).
98. Anderson, 945 S.W.2d at 818.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 819.
101. Id.
102. Vingcard, 59 S.W.3d at 870; see also Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., No. 03-01-00717-CV,
2002 WL 31833440, at *32-34 (Tex. App.-Austin Dec. 19, 2002, no pet.) (following Ving-
card but remanding for determination of fees based on reduction of award on prevailing
claims); Frost Crushed Stone Co., Inc. v. Odell Geer Constr. Co., No. 10-00-282-CV, 2002
WL 31778399, at *5 (Tex. App.-Waco Dec. 11, 2002, no pet. h.).
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quested percentages under the issue submitted, which required them to
award only a specific dollar amount" this was held not to violate the prin-
ciples articulated by the Supreme Court in Andersen.10 3 The percentage
in Vingcard was based upon the Rule 1.04 factors and covered all ex-
penses and co-counsel's attorneys' fees.10 4 Based on Vingcard, it may be
possible for an attorney to request fees as a percentage of damages if that
percentage is based on the Rule 1.04 factors-as opposed to merely the
contingent fee agreement-and the fact finder's award is in a dollar
amount, rather than a percentage. Note, however, that the litigant must
request a particular amount of fees from the jury or court.'0 5
B. APPLYING THE RULE 1.04 FACTORS
Although often cited, few cases provide a thoughtful analysis of the
Rule 1.04 factors that Andersen demands must be considered in calculat-
ing a reasonable fee. An exception to the usual cursory treatment is the
San Antonio Court of Appeals' opinion on remand in Herring v.
Bocquet.1° 6
In Herring, the San Antonio Court of Appeals carefully analyzed the
request for attorneys' fees according to the 1.04 factors. 10 7 As to the first
factor-time and labor required, novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and skill requisite to perform the legal service properly-the
Herring court focused on the fact that although the issues raised by the
case were not particularly novel or unique, the plaintiffs' counsel took a
"confused approach to a straightforward issue" such that an otherwise
simple case became complex. 0 8 Thus, the court found that defendants'
counsel was required to research numerous issues to make an "informed
response" to the plaintiffs' numerous arguments and noted that "the
more novel the approach, the more difficult the research can become."' 0 9
The court of appeals also noted that the defendants' summary judgment
was detailed, addressed all of the plaintiffs' contentions, and the exhibits
included deed record excerpts, affidavits of witnesses and experts, and
pages from deposition transcripts. 10 The Herring court also indicated
that the time expended during mediation and other settlement activities
addressing the various pleadings and amended pleadings and "developing
other defensive theories, including waiver, estoppel, limitations, and rati-
103. Vingcard, 59 S.W.3d at 870.
104. Id.
105. San Antonio Credit Union v. O'Connor, No. 04-00-00714-CV, 2002 WL 31662054,
at *19 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Nov. 27, 2002, no pet. h.) ("Although evidence of a con-
tingency fee may be considered by the factfinder in determining an appropriate amount of
attorneys' fees, a party seeking attorneys' fees must ask the jury to award fees in a specific
dollar amount, rather than merely a percentage of the total award.").
106. Herring, 21 S.W.3d at 367.
107. Id. at 368-69.
108. Id. at 369 n.2.




fication" contributed to the reasonableness of defendants' fees."'
The Herring court also addressed the third factor of Rule 1.04-"the
fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.""12 The
court noted that the defense counsel and the defense expert testified that
the fee was reasonable in light of the fee customarily charged in San
Antonio for the type of litigation involved.' 3 With respect to the fourth
factor-"the amount involved and the results obtained"-the Herring
court acknowledged that the trial court had heard testimony regarding
the importance of the issue to the defendants since the defendants' ability
to access their property was at stake.1 4 With no evidence to support the
fifth factor-the court moved to the sixth factor, the nature and length of
the professional relationship with the client-and found that the lack of a
prior relationship actually supported the fee award because the likelihood
of a future relationship was largely dependent on the success of the de-
fendants' counsel's.' 1 5
Finally, on remand, the Herring court examined the seventh factor in
Rule 1.04-the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyers per-
forming the legal services. The court noted that the lead lawyer had
thirty-one years of experience, had served as "an officer and director of
the San Antonio Bar Association and held the highest Martindale-Hub-
ble rating."' " 6 The court also addressed the lead lawyer's appropriate
delegation of less-advanced legal tasks to less experienced lawyers. 1' 7
The defendants' expert bolstered this evidence by testifying that the lead
lawyer had "an excellent reputation in the community."" 8
The Herring court's elaboration of the Rule 1.04 factors is probably the
most illustrative case law on the application of the Rule 1.04 factors in
Texas. The only three factors that are not addressed are fairly straightfor-
ward. The second factor, whether the matter precluded the lawyer from
accepting other legal matters, is easily analyzed. Likewise, the eighth fac-
tor-whether the fee was fixed or contingent-is straight forward. How-
ever, the fifth factor, the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances is more complex-one should look carefully at the circum-
stances of the matter and evaluate whether the client, the opposing law-
yer or client, the court, or other circumstances required the matter to be
111. Id. During this discussion, the court also discussed the number of conferences -
both with co-counsel and within the firm - by defendants' attorneys. The court noted
testimony from the attorneys involved that the conferences were necessary to relay infor-
mation to each other, discuss legal strategy in filing responses, and necessary to coordinate
and avoid unnecessary legal fees. Id. Defendants' expert witness also presented evidence
that "the number of conferences was not unusual." Id.
112. Id. at 370.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. However, it is notable that the sixth factor in Rule 1.04 is sometimes viewed as






handled against a short timetable. 1 9 For example, the obvious situation
is when the case involved an application for a temporary restraining order
or other injunctive relief. However, it also might be the case that the
court imposed an accelerated discovery schedule. Or, alternatively, the
client may have required the work to be completed in an expedited fash-
ion for business objectives. In any of these circumstances, the lawyer
should consider presenting evidence pursuant to Rule 1.04(6) to support
a fee award.
III. CALCULATING A REASONABLE FEE
Assuming that your client has a statutory, contractual, or equitable
right to attorneys' fees, as we have just explained, the client has a right to
request reasonable attorneys' fees. However, calculating the amount of
attorneys' fees to request from the court or jury is not necessarily a
straightforward task. First, a "reasonable fee" is not necessarily an hourly
fee-you should consider whether a multiplier should be applied to your
work. Second, not all fees that you have incurred on behalf of your client
are recoverable in court-you must pay careful attention to each time
entry submitted. Several common concerns are addressed herein.
A. USING A MULTIPLIER TO CALCULATE A REASONABLE FEE
Contrary to popular belief, a reasonable fee may not be simply the
multiplication of an attorneys' rate by the number of hours expended.
Sometimes, because of the circumstances of a case, an enhanced award
may be appropriate. By applying a multiplier to the amount of hours
expended, an attorney may be permitted to recover additional fees.
The "lodestar" method calculates attorneys' fees by "multiplying the
number of hours expended by an appropriate hourly rate determined by
a variety of factors, such as the benefits obtained for the [client], the com-
plexity of the issues involved, the expertise of counsel, the preclusion of
other legal work due to acceptance of the ... suit, and the hourly rate
customarily charged in the region for similar legal work.' 2 0 This number
(the number of hours worked times an hourly rate determined by court)
is called a lodestar, presumably because the number provides a guiding
point-or lodestar-in the determination of an appropriate award.12'
After the "lodestar" is calculated, the court can apply a multiplier to de-
termine the amount of the award for attorneys' fees.' 22 Multipliers vary
119. Id.
120. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 960 (Tex. 1996) (holding that lode-
star is determined by multiplying number of hours reasonably spent by an hourly rate court
deems reasonable for similarly complex, non-contingent work); see Crouch, 853 S.W.2d at
647; Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 956; Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Flores, 955 S.W.2d
861, 870 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).
121. See Scott A. Brister, Proof of Attorneys' Fees in Texas, 24 St. Mary's L.J. 313, 327
(1993).
122. See Guity v. C.C.I. Enter., Co., 54 S.W.3d 526, 528-29 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (remanding case for evaluation of reasonable fee).
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from case to case because they are determined by factors such as the
complexity of the case, the skill of the attorney, the amount of recovery,
and the contingent nature of the case.12 3 As long as the resulting fee is
not unreasonable, the amount of the multiplier is largely determined at
the discretion of the trial court.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that a multiplier of 1.5 was
appropriate in a case where the plaintiff was required to pierce multiple
layers of corporate bureaucracy and the jury found for the plaintiff on all
liability issues. 124 In another case, a multiplier of two (2) was held to be
appropriate where the case was complex and involved numerous theories
of recovery, a mountain of evidence, vigorous discovery, and a number of
pre-trial hearings. In addition, the trial lasted nine days with testimony
from more than twenty witnesses. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff
on all issues.' 25
In Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Gonzales, the El Paso Court of
Appeals affirmed a multiplier of two (2) where the case "involved novel
and complex issues" such that the controlling federal case law made the
case "not just an uphill battle, but an exercise in windmill tilting. '126 Fur-
ther, the Dillard court noted that there was ample evidence that the mat-
ter was a "daily basis case" and that the attorney gave up multiple other
cases to work on the matter.127
On the other hand, in Mission Park Funeral Chapel, Inc. v. Gallegos,
the court refused to apply a multiplier of three (3).1 28 The court stated
that there "was no testimony that a jury could appropriately use a multi-
plier to further increase attorneys' fees beyond the amount calculated us-
ing an hourly fee approach," "there was no jury instruction regarding use
of a multiplier," and "there is no authority for its use in a case such as
this."' 29
B. ARE PRE-PETITION AND/OR RELATED ACTION
FEES RECOVERABLE?
A common question that arises in the fee recovery stage of a case is
whether attorneys' fees incurred before the filing of a suit can be recov-
ered. In Williamson v. Tucker, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that pre-
petition fees incurred from the point of placing a note in the hands of an
123. See Crouch, 853 S.W.2d at 647; Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 956.
124. Borg-Warner, 955 S.W.2d at 870.
125. City of Alamo v. Espinosa, No. 13-99-704-CV (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 31,
2001, pet. dism'd by agr.) (not designated for publication), 2001 WL 1003309, *14; see also
Haggar Apparel Co. v. Leal, No. 13-00-275-CV, 2002 WL 31478172, at *9 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi Nov. 7, 2002, pet. filed) (requesting multiplier of 2.0).
126. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d 398, 412 (Tex. App.-EI Paso
2002, pet. denied).
127. Id. at 413.
128. Mission Park Funeral Chapel, Inc. v. Gallegos, No. 04-00-00459-CV (Tex. App.-





attorney for collection and participation in a related federal suit were re-
coverable. 130 The Texas Supreme Court subsequently cited this holding
with approval in Shook. 31 In Shook, the supreme court held that a bank
that was forced to defend against a borrower's claims before recovering
the outstanding balance of a note could recover all of its attorneys' fees.
This was true despite the fact that counsel had actually only spent a few
hours on the cause of action for collection on the note.132
Similarly, legal fees in related matters can sometimes be recovered.
Many times a "case" is not really one legal action, but rather several dif-
ferent disputes in a variety of forums. The question becomes whether
fees can be collected in one action for work performed for another re-
lated-indeed, sometimes integral-matter. Several courts have deter-
mined that fees incurred in proceedings in other courts are recoverable
when they relate directly to the claim for which the party was entitled to
recover attorneys' fees.133
C. ARE ALL FEES RECOVERABLE IF ONLY ONE CLAIM PERMITTING
THE RECOVERY OF FEES IS ASSERTED?
Another common and practical problem is how to recover fees for
work performed in furtherance of a breach of contract or declaratory
judgment claim when a tort claim was also asserted in the same case.
Assuming the statutory requirements can be satisfied, the attorney is per-
mitted to recover fees for work performed on the contract claim, but at-
torneys' fees are not recoverable for the tort work.134
Ordinarily, an attorney is required to segregate fees incurred on claims
that allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees from claims that do not al-
low the recovery of attorneys' fees.135 In fact, "[a] failure to segregate
130. Williamson, 615 S.W.2d at 892-93; see also Swiss Ave. Bank v. Slivka, 724 S.W.2d
394, 398 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (holding that a party is entitled to recover
attorneys fees incurred in defending a prior injunction proceeding).
131. RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Shook, 653 S.W.2d 278, 282-283 (Tex. 1983).
132. Id.
133. Gill Say. Ass'n, 797 S.W.2d at 32 (disapproving holding of "the court of appeals
that, as a matter of law, attorneys' fees incurred in a related bankruptcy proceeding cannot
be awarded in a breach of contract claim"); Boulware v. Sec. State Bank of Navasota, Tex.,
640 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ) (holding that party
could recover attorneys' fees incurred prosecuting related claim in court of claims to re-
cover balance of a note); see also McAdams v. McAdams, No. 07-01-0343-CV (Tex. App.-
Amarillo Mar. 1, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 342639, at *13
(awarding fees incurred in first trial prior to appeal).
134. Int'l Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 496 S.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Tex. 1973); Flint & Assocs.,
739 S.W.2d at 624 ("As a rule, in a case involving more than one claim, attorney fees can
be awarded only for necessary legal services rendered in connection with the claims for
which recovery is authorized.").
135. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex. 1997); Stewart Title
Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex. 1991); Am. Hallmark Ins. Co. v. Lyde, No. 05-
97-01611-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 15, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication),
2000 WL 1702597, at *9 ("[S]egregation of attorneys' fees is required between claims which
allow recovery of fees and claims which do not."); Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P'ship v.
Newton Corp., No. 05-02-00070-CV, 2003 WL 152732, at *8 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 23,
2003, no pet. h.).
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attorneys' fees in a case containing multiple causes of action, only some
of which entitle the recovery of attorneys' fees, can result in the recovery
of zero attorneys' fees."'1 36 However, where the claims are "dependent
upon the same set of facts or circumstances and are thus intertwined to
the point of being inseparable, the party suing for attorneys' fees may
recover the entire amount covering all claims."'1 37 This exception-in
modern business litigation-often swallows the rule. Of course, to be en-
titled to all of the intertwined fees, the party seeking fees must have pre-
vailed on the claim that provides for the recovery of fees. 138 Further, the
court-not the fact finder-makes the determination of whether fees
must be segregated. 139
In City of Alamo v. Espinosa, for example, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals held that the issues raised in the plaintiffs' claims "stem from the
same set of facts and circumstances surrounding his demotion," and thus,
segregation would have been impracticable. 140 However, for the excep-
tion to apply, the claims must be so similar that the same facts must need
to be proven for both claims. 141 Further, to be sustained on appeal, the
trial court must specifically perform this segregation analysis when evalu-
ating the attorneys' fees award.' 42
D. ARE FEES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF A
COUNTERCLAIM RECOVERABLE?
Similarly, the general rule is that segregation of fees is required if a
litigant prosecutes a counterclaim that permits recovery of attorneys' fees
and also defends a claim in the same action. However, segregation is not
required if the fees cannot be allocated between prosecuting the counter-
claim and defending the claims.143 Stated another way, if the plaintiff
must defeat the counterclaim to succeed on the principal claim because
they arise out of the same facts and are mutually exclusive, then the time
136. Green Int'l Inc., 951 S.W.2d at 389. Of course if objection to such a failure to
segregate is not made, the objection to recovery of all fees is waived. Id.
137. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d at 73; S. Concrete Co. v. Metrotec Fin., Inc., 775 S.W.2d 446,
450-51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ); World Help, 977 S.W.2d at 684; Schindler, 829
S.W.2d at 288 (granting total amount of fees billed to matter when "causes of action are so
intertwined that they are more or less inseparable"); City of Alamo, 2001 WL 1003309, at
*13.
138. Huddleston v. Pace, 790 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ
denied).
139. Merchandise Ctr., Inc. v. WNS, Inc., 85 S.W.3d 389, 398 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2002, no pet.).
140. City of Alamo, 2001 WL 1003309, at *13.
141. See, e.g., Z.A.O., Inc. v. Yarbrough Drive Ctr. Joint Venture, 50 S.W.3d 531, 550-51
(Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.); Lesikar, 33 S.W.3d at 317.
142. Rainbow Group, 2002 WL 1991141, at *11.
143. Pegasus Energy Group, Inc. v. Cheyenne Petroleum Co., 3 S.W.3d 112, 130 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied); Coleman v. Rotana, Inc., 778 S.W.2d 867, 873-74
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Wilkins v. Bain, 615 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (granting all fees when "claim to recover the contract price
necessarily involved the same facts as [the] counterclaim" "both arise out of the same
transaction; thus, whether the contract was oral or written").
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spent to defend against the counterclaim need not be segregated from the
time spent pursuing the claim.
In Pegasus Energy Group, Inc. v. Cheyenne Petroleum Co., the court
explained:
Attorneys' fees are available for defense of a claim or counterclaim
when both the claim and counterclaim are contractual and arise from
the same transaction or set of facts. In such cases, the same facts
required to prosecute the claim are also required to defend against
the counterclaim and a fee claimant is not required to segregate the
time the attorney spends preparing his claim and the time spent de-
fending the counterclaim. 144
Again, in many cases, the exception is more common than the rule.
E. ARE LEGAL ASSISTANT FEES RECOVERABLE?
The question of whether one should recover legal assistant fees may
seem obvious to the practitioner. Unfortunately, it is not.
Although the Texas Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, the
leading case on the issue has been followed. 145 The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals, in Gill Savings Ass'n v. International Supply Co., set forth the basic
test. The court held that "compensation for a legal assistant's work may
be separately assessed and included in the award of attorneys' fees if a
legal assistant performs work that has traditionally been done by any at-
torney.' 1 46 To recover for the work of a legal assistant, one must estab-
lish: "(1) that the legal assistant is qualified through education, training or
work experience to perform substantive legal work; (2) that substantive
legal work was performed under the direction and supervision of an at-
torney; (3) the nature of the legal work which was performed; (4) the
hourly rate being charged for the legal assistant; and (5) the number of
hours expended by the legal assistant."' 147
In addressing this case of apparent first impression, the Dallas Court of
Appeals assessed the increasing use and significance of legal assistants in
the day to day operations of a law firm. 148 The court quoted the prelimi-
nary statement of the General Guidelines for the Utilization of the Ser-
vices of Legal Assistants by Attorneys:
Providing legal services to the public at an affordable price without
reduction in the quality of services finds ample support in the pur-
pose clause of the State Bar Act as well as in the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. It is a goal toward which the Bar is committed,
both in principle and in practice. The utilization by attorneys of the
services of legal assistants is recognized as one means by which the
Bar may attain this goal. With direction and supervision by an attor-
144. Pegasus Energy Group, 3 S.W.3d at 130.
145. See Multi-Moto Corp. v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 806 S.W.2d 560, 570-71 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied) (holding consistent with leading cases).
146. Gill Savings, 759 S.W.2d at 702.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 703.
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ney, legal assistants can perform a wide variety of tasks which may
neither constitute the unauthorized practice of law nor require the
traditional exercise of an attorneys' training, experience, knowledge
or professional judgment.' 49
The guidelines go on to say:
A legal assistant is a person not admitted to the practice of law in
Texas but ultimately subject to the definition of "the practice of law"
as set forth in the law of the State of Texas, who has, through educa-
tion, training and experience, demonstrated knowledge of the legal
system, legal principles and procedures, and who uses such knowl-
edge in rendering paralegal assistance to an attorney in the represen-
tation of that attorneys' clients. The attorney is responsible for the
work of the legal assistant and the legal assistant remains, at all
times, responsible to and under the supervision and direction of the
attorney. The functions of a legal assistant are defined by the attor-
ney responsible for the legal assistant's supervision and direction,
and are limited only to the extent that they are limited by law.
An attorney may charge and bill a client for a legal assistant's
time, but the attorney may not share legal fees with a legal assistant
under his or her supervision and direction. 150
The Gill Savings court focused on the time and labor component of a
reasonable fee in reaching its holding:
Properly employed and supervised legal assistants can decrease liti-
gation expense and improve an attorneys' efficiency.... Further, the
purpose and objective of our legal system is to provide the most eq-
uitable, efficient adjudication of litigation at the least expense practi-
cable. Likewise, as suggested by the Guidelines, legal assistant
charges are an appropriate component of attorneys' fees since an at-
torney would have to have performed the services if a legal assistant
had not been used.' 51
The Gill Savings court ultimately determined that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support an award of attorneys' fees
because the time sheets submitted did not establish (1) the qualifications,
if any, of the legal assistants who performed the work; (2) whether the
tasks performed by the legal assistants were of a substantive legal nature
or were the performance of clerical duties; and (3) the hourly rate
charged for the legal assistant. 152 The court also held that without testi-
mony identifying the initials in the timesheets, it was impossible to deter-
mine which class of professional-qualified legal assistants or legal
clerks-had performed which tasks.' 53
In Moody v. EMC Services, Inc., the Houston Court of Appeals, Four-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 704.




teenth District followed the five-factor test established by Gill Savings.154
Even though the claimant failed to specifically identify the legal assistants
or their qualifications, the court affirmed the possibility of awarding at-
torneys' fees for work performed by legal assistants. 155
There are several lessons to learn from Gill Savings and its progeny.
First, not all legal assistant time is recoverable. The work must be of the
type that an attorney traditionally performed. This requirement is easily
overlooked-as the normal practice is for the party requesting fees to
submit all of its legal fees statements in a redacted form for payment by
the opposing party. At least in Dallas, when seeking fees for legal assist-
ants, the testimony supporting the reasonableness of the fees must specif-
ically address the legal assistants' fees and specify that the work
performed by the legal assistants was of the type that an attorney tradi-
tionally performed.' 56 Second, the testimony should specify the legal as-
sistants' qualifications and that the legal assistants performed substantive
legal work that was not clerical in nature.157
F. ARE APPELLATE FEES RECOVERABLE?
An additional question that often arises with respect to the recovery of
attorneys' fees involves the recovery of fees for appellate work. Texas
juries are routinely asked to award fees for appellate work that will only
be paid in the event such work is undertaken. A fee request for appellate
work should be segregated into fees for work to be performed in courts of
appeals and the supreme court and supported by sufficient evidence. 158
Appellate fee awards are often reformed by the courts. 159
IV. RECOVERY OF EXPENSES.
Like attorneys' fees, expenses are not recoverable unless there is a stat-
ute that expressly provides for their recovery. 160 Furthermore, the Dallas
Court of Appeals has held that ordinary expenses like photocopy, travel,
long distance, postage, filing fees, fax charges, and messenger/courier ex-
penses are typically not recoverable as expenses because they are consid-
ered part of "the overhead of a law practice" and can be recovered as a





158. Chrysler-Plymouth City, Inc. v. Guerrero, 620 S.W.2d 700, 706-07 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ) (holding that a jury award of attorney fees including
potential appellate work was supported by sufficient evidence in the record); see also Cen-
troplex Ford, Inc. v. Kirby, 736 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
159. See Bradbury v. Scott, 788 S.W.2d 31, 40 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989,
writ denied).
160. "Ordinary expenses incurred by a party in prosecuting or defending suit cannot be
recovered either as damages or by way of court costs in the absence of statutory provisions




component of reasonable attorneys' fees at least pursuant to Section
38.001.161 These "ordinary expenses" are not recoverable as a separate
category of costs. 162
As a general rule "each party to a suit shall be liable to the officers of
the court for all costs incurred by himself."1 63 As is often the case, how-
ever, there are many exceptions to the general rule. A careful examina-
tion of any relevant statutes and case law is necessary to determine
whether specific costs are recoverable in any given case. The following
discussion provides an overview of the most frequently addressed statu-
tory provisions and case law discussing cost recovery.
A. RECOVERING COSTS
Many costs are recoverable by statute. Section 31.007 of the Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code allows a judge to "include in any order or judg-
ment all costs," including:
1. Clerk's fees and any service fees due to the county;
2. Court reporter's fees for original stenographic transcripts obtained
to use in the suit;
3. The fee for masters, interpreters, and guardians ad litem appointed
by the court; and
4. Such other costs and fees as may be permitted by these rules and
state statutes.
164
Further, under Rule 131 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a suc-
cessful party is entitled to recover "all costs incurred therein" from its
adversary. 65 "Rule 131's underlying purpose is to ensure that the pre-
vailing party is freed of the burden of court costs and that the losing party
pays those costs."'1 66 The court can stray from this mandatory require-
ment only "for good cause."' 167 "'Good cause' is an elusive concept that
varies from case to case."'168 Generally "good cause" will be found when
a party "unnecessarily prolonged proceedings, unreasonably increased
costs," or generally did something that should be punished. 169 If the
court determines costs should not be awarded, then "good cause" for
such an award must be stated on the record. 170 Even when the trial court
states good cause on the record "an appellate court should scrutinize the
161. Flint & Assocs., 739 S.W.2d at 626; Arthur's Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Sec. Sys.,
Inc., 997 S.W.2d 803, 817 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
162. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 2001); Am. Hallmark Ins.
Co., 2000 WL 1702957, at *11.
163. TEX. R. Civ. P. 140.
164. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 31.007 (Vernon 2001).
165. TEX. R. Civ. P. 131. However, it should be noted that the statute provides for
recovery of costs "except where otherwise provided." Id.
166. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Tex. 2001).
167. TEX. R. Civ. P. 141.
168. Furr's, 535 S.W.3d at 376-77.
169. Id. at 377. Potential emotional harm from assessing costs to the losing party is not




record to determine whether it supports the trial judge's decision. 1' 71
B. NON-RECOVERABLE COSTS
Some costs are specifically disallowed, either by statute or case law.
For example, Rule 902(10)(a) of the Texas Rules of Evidence requires a
party to bear its own copying costs if it chooses to copy records attached
to affidavits filed by another party.172 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 140
prohibits including fees for copies in an award of costs. 173 Case law also
disallows certain items, such as expert witness fees174 and costs for certi-
fied copies of deeds used at trial.' 75
V. PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR COLLECTING
LEGAL FEES
Provided that the statute or contract provides for their recovery and
that a reasonable award can be calculated, the practical considerations of
actually recovering the fee must be addressed.
A. SET UP A BILLING NUMBER AS SOON AS You ARE ASKED
TO PERFORM SERVICES
While it might seem obvious to set up a billing matter number if you
plan to seek an attorneys' fees award on the basis of the hours expended
in connection with a dispute, it is often-and easily-overlooked until the
"matter" becomes a full blown case. The attorneys' fees lost based in the
interim period between a dispute and a lawsuit can be substantial. As
explained above, pre-lawsuit fees can be awarded if they are properly
attributable to the case. Accordingly, to maximize your client's attor-
neys' fees award, you should set up a distinct billing number as soon as
you are asked to perform legal services in connection with a dispute.
Another similar problem is the case of the growing billing number.
The billing number is set up and used for one matter, and that matter
subsequently "hatches" another legal matter. Again, as explained above,
sometimes it is possible to recover legal fees for "related" legal matters.
However, to ensure that your client is not denied fees based on an inabil-
ity to segregate, it is advisable to be mindful of growing billing numbers
and separate as soon as it appears that the second legal matter is distinct
from the original legal matter.
171. Allen v. Crabtree, 936 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ) (citing
Rogers v. Walmart Stores, 686 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1985).
172. See Allen, 936 S.W.2d at 8; TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 902(10)(a).
173. The rule provides that "no fee for a copy of a paper not required by law or these
rules to be copied shall be taxed in the bill of costs." TEX. R. Civ. P. 140.
174. See City of Houston v. Biggers, 380 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Allen, 936 S.W.2d at 8.
175. Phillips v. Wertz, 579 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see also Allen, 936 S.W.3d at 8.
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B. RECORD YOUR TIME ACCURATELY AND PRECISELY
To recover attorneys' fees, a litigant must produce adequate documen-
tation of the hours expended. 176 "Where the documentation of hours is
inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly."'1 77
However, there is no special documentation that is required. 178
Again, a recommendation to accurately record time is hardly novel ad-
vice. However, problems are common in two situations. First, a lawyer
who does not normally record time-but, instead, typically earns contin-
gent fees-is criticized for lack of documentation to support a fee re-
quest. Second, fee requests are attacked because a lawyer who normally
records time has submitted vague, conclusory entries that leave the op-
posing party at a loss to understand what the attorney did and, if appro-
priate, challenge the time spent on the task as unreasonable. 179 The
answer to both of these problems is to accurately record your time.
When submitting your fee statements, you should ask yourself whether
the time you spent performing a task could be discerned and evaluated
from your record.'80 If that is not possible, you should consider deleting
certain entries from your fee request.
C. REVIEW THE BILL TO ENSURE DUPLICATION WAS AVOIDED,
ATTORNEYS WITH APPROPRIATE EXPERIENCE LEVELS WERE
ASSIGNED TO APPROPRIATE TASKS, AND INAPPROPRIATE
TASKS WERE NOT BILLED
It is a "well-settled principle that attorneys' fees must be awarded only
for those lawyer hours that are reasonably necessary to adequately prose-
cute the case." 181 "Attorneys' fees must not be awarded for attorney
hours that are 'excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.' 1 82
A common method of attacking the reasonableness of attorney billing
statements is to criticize the number of attorneys involved in a particular
task.' 83 For example, attorneys' fees may be attacked when multiple law-
176. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens No. 4552 (LULAC) v. Roscoe Indep.
Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d 1228, 1233 (5th Cir. 1997).
177. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); LULAC, 119 F.3d at 1233 ("[i]f the
applicant's documentation of the hours claimed is 'vague or incomplete,' the district court
may reduce or eliminate those hours."). "Litigants take their chances when submitting...
fee applications ... provid[ing] little information from which to determine the 'reasonable-
ness' of the hours expended on tasks vaguely referred to .... La. Power & Light Co. v.
Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 327 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Sieber & Calicutt, 66 S.W.3d 340.
178. Hanif v. Alexander Oil Co., No. 01-01-00954-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
Sept. 19, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication, 2002 WL 31087247, at *34 ("None
of the eight [1.04] factors mandates that time records be kept or precludes an estimate.").
179. For example, the following entry provides little detail: "8.0-Draft correspon-
dence; conferences regarding same."
180. Remember, however, that these statements should be redacted for privileged com-
munications before submission.
181. EEOC v. Clear Lake Dodge, 60 F.3d 1146, 1154 (5th Cir. 1995).
182. Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).
183. See West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac, 94 S.W.3d 248, 269 (Tex. App.-Austin




yers attend a deposition or hearing. Similarly, internal conferences are
often highlighted as somehow unreasonable. Another common criticism
in attorneys' fee litigation is that the attorney performing the task was
overqualified for the task. These critiques are often unfair, as in hind-
sight many aspects of a case are now clearly less important than they
seemed at the time the tasks were performed.
These criticisms should be anticipated and met head on. A lawyer bill-
ing a client on the basis of hourly fee statements should routinely and
carefully review his or her statements before they are sent to the client to
ensure that excessive charges are never billed. This careful and contem-
poraneous review will save hours later in the fee recovery stage of a mat-
ter. It is obviously impossible to remember and evaluate whether each
attorneys' time entry listed on years' of billing statements was appropri-
ate. However, if the attorneys' fees statements are regularly reviewed for
duplicative and inappropriate tasks, an attorney seeking fees can testify
that he or she conducted this review. This is-obviously-far more per-
suasive than trying to recreate history at the time of a fee request.
D. PROPERLY REQUEST FEES IN PETITION OR COMPLAINT
To obtain attorneys' fees, they must be pled. However, unless chal-
lenged, even a general allegation in a petition that a party is seeking at-
torney fees can serve as proper notice to the opposing party. 18 4 In
Bullock v. Regular Veterans Ass'n, the defendant's failure to point out, by
special exception, the lack of specificity in the pleading with regard to the
basis for attorney fees resulted in a waiver of the objection to the fee
request. 185 Further, a general plea for reasonable attorneys' fees in a pe-
tition is sufficient to authorize an award of fees in appellate courts. 186
E. DESIGNATE AN ATTORNEYS' FEES EXPERT
If a request for attorneys' fees has been made, it should not be forgot-
ten in the discovery process. An attorneys' fees expert must be identified
in discovery pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.18 7 Failure to
comply with this requirement results in exclusion of testimony unless the
proffering party demonstrates good cause for its admission.' 88 For exam-
ple, in GATX Tank Erection Corp. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., the plain-
tiff's counsel called himself as an expert witness regarding attorney fees,
184. Bullock v. Regular Veterans Ass'n, 806 S.W.2d 311, 314-15 (Tex. App.-Austin
1991, no writ).
185. Id.
186. Ledisco Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 951, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1976, no writ) (citing Wolfe v. Speed Fab-Crete Corp. Int'l, 507 S.W.2d 276, 281 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ); see also Purvis Oil Corp. v. Hillin, 890 S.W.2d 931,
939 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ) (holding that attorney could recover for attorneys
fees for summary judgment motion when basis for attorneys' fees not identified in motion
but plead in petition).
187. Sharp v. Broadway, 784 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1990).
188. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Tex. 1987).
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
but he had not identified himself as a testifying expert in discovery. The
San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's counsel's testi-
mony should have been excluded by the trial court because of the plain-
tiff's failure to identify their attorney as their attorneys' fees expert. 189
However, at least one Texas court has held that an attorney who has
not been identified as an expert witness with regard to attorneys' fees can
still testify as a fact witness regarding the facts of his representation.
Thereafter, at least if fees are sought in connection with a declaratory
judgment proceeding, a trial court can use this fact testimony and take
judicial notice of the usual and customary attorney fees in a proceeding
without receiving further evidence and can make an award.' 90 This way
around the expert testimony requirement is a clever way to request attor-
neys' fees if the expert witness disclosure has not been made, but the
obviously preferable approach is to timely designate an attorneys' fees
expert.
F. PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING FEE
The last step, of course, to recovering attorneys' fees is presenting evi-
dence to establish the reasonable amount of the fees to the fact finder.1 91
This can be accomplished in a variety of ways.
The court does not have to hold a separate hearing on attorneys'
fees, 192 but it can do so.193 Because Rule 166a(c) prohibits oral testimony
at summary judgment hearings, some judges choose to have a separate
hearing with oral testimony on the issue of attorneys' fees. 194 Alterna-
tively, attorneys' fees can be determined at trial.' 95 This must be accom-
189. GATX Tank Erection Corp. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 693 S.W.2d 617, 620-621
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Nelson v. Schanzer, 788 S.W.2d
81, 88 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied.); but see Wilson v. Chazanow,
No. 13-00-665-CV, 2002 WL 959995, at *4 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi May 9, 2002, no
pet.) (affirming trial court's admission of attorney testimony when attorney was mistakenly
designated as fact witness instead of expert witness in pretrial disclosures).
190. Budd, 846 S.W.2d at 524; TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 et seq.
(Vernon 2001); see also In re Striegler, 915 S.W.2d 629, 643-44 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996,
writ denied).
191. Whether a party is entitled to legal fees is an issue of law, but the reasonable
amount of fees is an issue of fact. See Holland, I S.W.3d at 94; Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co.
v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. 1966); Wallace v. Ramon, 82 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
192. For example, attorneys' fees may be granted after summary judgment based upon
affidavits submitted by expert witnesses. See, e.g., Guity, 54 S.W.3d at 528 (determining
reasonable attorneys' fees in FLSA case); Grace, 54 S.W.3d at 338 (determining reasonable
fees in contracts case). If the affidavit is not opposed, fees can be awarded on summary
judgment. See, e.g., Chu v. Chew, No. 05-00-02107-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 17, 2002,
pet. denied) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 59269, *4.
193. See, e.g., Eller Media Co. v. Texas, 51 S.W.3d 783, 786-87 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2001, no pet.).
194. See, e.g., Estate of Davis v. Cook, 9 S.W.3d 288, 295 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1999, no pet.).
195. See, e.g., Wayne v. Hybner, No. 13-00-00054-CV (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
Aug. 31, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2001 WL 1003298; Jackson Law
Office, 37 S.W.3d at 23.
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plished with expert testimony-either from the attorney seeking fees or
another attorney who has studied the attorneys' actions with respect to
the case.
There must be evidence in the record to support the reasonableness of
the award to avoid complications on appeal. 196 While attorneys' fees are
typically determined by the fact finder, under certain circumstances ex-
pert testimony can establish attorneys' fees as a matter of law.197 Where
there is testimony of attorneys' fees that is "clear, positive, and direct,
and not contradicted by any other witness or attendant circumstances,"
attorneys' fees are established as a matter of law. 198 "This is especially
true where the opposing party had the means and opportunity of disprov-
ing the testimony, if it were not true, and failed to do so."'199
In the authors' opinion, the best way to present evidence of reasonable
attorneys' fees is through an expert witness. In a jury proceeding, the
jury might be offended at the size of the fee the attorney is requesting.
Similarly, if the attorney requesting attorneys' fees is viewed as making
an admission or is otherwise impeached on cross examination, the attor-
ney may lose credibility with the jury. Having another attorney testify
about the request takes the focus off the attorney that is trying to argue
the merits of the client's case.
Of course, the expert must be properly designated and prepared. Prep-
aration will depend on the amount of the fees requested, but a safe place
to start is to provide the expert with the live pleadings, any briefing on
attorneys' fees, the pleading index, and statements that have been re-
dacted for privilege. Although you will undoubtedly be busy preparing
for trial or the hearing, you should, if possible, meet with the expert so
that the expert can interview you about the Rule 1.04 factors.
The expert should use the Rule 1.04 factors in his or her testimony and
elaborate on the applicable elements. The expert should also testify
about the various additional requirements found in case law. For exam-
ple, if a segregation problem is present, the expert should testify about
the relationship between the various claims or the claims and the counter-
claims and, if necessary, the segregation of fees. The expert should also
consider legal assistant time and testify about the necessary requirements
for recovering such fees. If fees for pre-petition or related matters are
sought, the expert must be provided the background documents and fee
statements for such work and testify accordingly. Additionally, the ex-
pert should make a reasonable estimate of the attorneys' fees necessary
for the various levels of appellate review. Finally, you should determine
196. See Estrello v. Elboar, 965 S.W.2d 754, 759 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.)
(even where there is a statute mandating the award of attorneys' fees, the party seeking
recovery must put on evidence of their amount and reasonableness).
197. Eller, 51 S.W.3d at 786-87.
198. Id.; see also Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.
1990); Clary Corp. v. Smith, 949 S.W.2d 452, 469 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. de-
nied); World Help, 977 S.W.2d at 684.
199. See Clary, 949 S.W.2d at 469; World Help, 977 S.W.2d at 684.
2003] 1143
1144 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
whether the expert should testify about reasonable costs and, if appropri-
ate, present such testimony.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that the road to recovering a client's attorneys' fees is
so treacherous. Without careful attention to the proper procedures-
practical and legal-for recovering fees, recovery of fees can be difficult.
To best navigate the path, you should be mindful of your billing practices
and beware that your fee statements will ultimately be evaluated by the
court. You should also be creative and expansive in seeking fees. The
use of the equitable principles or a multiplier should be considered. All
aspects of your fees and expenses should be critically evaluated to deter-
mine whether recovery may be possible-fees in a related case, defending
in a counterclaim, etc. may be recoverable.
Like practicing law in any other field, recovering attorneys' fees is an
art, not a science. To maximize client satisfaction, one should develop the
art of recovering attorneys' fees.
